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PERIMETER RULES, PROPRIETARY POWERS, AND THE
AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT: A TALE OF TWO




T HIS CASE NOTE examines the two most recent court deci-
sions in the long-running battle over airline service at Dallas
Love Field and Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport - Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Transportation' and Legend Air-
lines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, Texas.2 From its earliest inception
in the 1960's to the present, the goal of establishing and main-
taining a regional airport in the Dallas-Fort Worth area has
spawned a series of court cases and legislative enactments. The
overarching issue in the two cases addressed in this article was
whether a local government-in light of the preemption and
proprietary powers provisions in the federal Airline Deregula-
tion Act-may enforce a regulation designed to protect a re-
gional airport from competition by imposing a perimeter rule
on a neighboring airport.'
* Robert B. Gilbreath is a shareholder in the law firm ofJenkens & Gilchrist,
P.C., in Dallas, Texas and was appellate counsel for Legend Airlines, Inc. in the
state court cases discussed in this article. He is board certified in Civil Appellate
Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. He received hisJ.D. from Baylor
University School of Law in 1989 and was Lead Articles Editor for the Baylor Law
Review.
** Paul C. Watler is a shareholder in the law firm ofJenkens & Gilchrist, P.C.
in Dallas, Texas and was lead counsel for Legend Airlines, Inc. in the state court
cases discussed in this article. He is board certified in Civil Trial law by the Texas
Board of Legal Specialization. He received his J.D. from the University of Texas
in 1981 and was a member of the Texas Law Review.
1 202 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2740 (2000).
2 23 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).
3 See generally Jonathan Whitman Cross, Airport Perimeter Rules: An Exception to
Federal Preemption, 17 TRANSP. L.J. 101 (1988).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.
A. DALLAs AND FORT WORTH AGREE TO BUILD A
REGIONAL AIRPORT.
For years, the neighboring Texas cities of Dallas and Fort
Worth engaged in a fierce rivalry for the business of commercial
aviation and air carriers.4 Love Field-owned and operated by
Dallas since 1928-is only five to six miles from downtown Dal-
las.5 From time to time, as air traffic increased, Dallas enlarged
and improved the facilities at Love Field.' In 1953, Fort Worth
responded by opening a new airport called "Greater Southwest
International Airport" (GSIA), midway between the two cities.7
The two airports were a mere 12 miles from one another.' Serv-
ing two airports so close together resulted in inadequate and
incomplete air service to both cities and unnecessary expense to
the carriers as well as the taxpayers. 9
In 1962, the federal Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) began in-
vestigating whether the cities should be forced to designate a
single airport as the point through which all interstate air car-
rier service to Dallas and Fort Worth would be provided.10 After
numerous hearings, the CAB gave the cities six months to reach
a voluntary agreement designating a single airport through
which interstate air carriers would serve the area. I I The CAB
4 See City of Dallas, Texas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1019
(N.D. Tex. 1973), affd, 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079
(1974); see also Eric A. Allen, Comment, The Wright Amendment: The Constitutional-
ity and Propriety of the Restrictions on Dallas Love Field, 55J. AIR L. & CoM. 1011, 1013
(1990); Lyn Loyd Creswell, Airport Policy in the United States: The Need for Accounta-
bility, Planning, and Leadership, 19 TRANSP. Lj. 1, 99 n.76 (1990); SrANLEY H.
Sco-r & LEVI H. DAVIS, A GIANT IN TEXAS, A HISTORY OF THE DALLAS FORT
WORTH REGIONAL AIRPORT CONTROVERSV 1911-1974 (1974); Love Field: Should Dal-
las Airport Have Expanded Flights?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, October 27, 1997, at
12A; ADA Preempts Dallas From Enforcing Service Restrictions, 18 ANDREWS AXIATION
LIIG. REP. 4 June 27, 2000).
See Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp.1019; see also Atkinson v. City of Dallas,
353 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
I- See Atkinson, 353 S.W.2d at 278.
7 See Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1019; see also Allen, supra note 4, at
1014 n. 6.
s See Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1019.
q See id.; see also Allen, supra note 4, at 1014.
II See Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1020.
' See id.; see also Continental Bus. Sys., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359,
361 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
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advised that if the cities could not reach an agreement, it would
designate either Love Field or GSIA. 12
Rather than choosing one of the two existing airports, Fort
Worth and Dallas agreed to construct and operate a new re-
gional airport to be located midway between the two cities. 3
The citiesjointly adopted the 1968 Regional Airport Concurrent
Bond Ordinance ("the Bond Ordinance"), which authorized is-
suance of joint revenue bonds for the financing of the new air-
port, later christened "Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport"
(DFW).' 4
Among other things, the Bond Ordinance provided that the
cities would take "such steps as may be necessary, appropriate,
and legally permissible" to phase out "[c]ertificated [a]ir
[c]arrier" service at Love Field and GSIA and to transfer such
activities to DFW.' 5 To effectuate the phase out of service at
Love Field, the Regional Airport Board (the DFW Board) exe-
cuted use agreements with the eight CAB-certificated air carriers
then serving the Dallas-Fort Worth area. The use agreements
provided that the carriers would move their operations to DFW
"to the extent required under [the Bond Ordinance].'16
B. SOUTHWEST AIRLINEs REFUSES TO MOVE TO THE
NEW AIRPORT.
Subsequently, however, Southwest Airlines began providing
intrastate service from Love Field to Houston and San Antonio
under authority granted by the Texas Aeronautics Commis-
sion.' 7 Southwest advised the DFW Board that it would remain
at Love Field when the eight CAB-certificated carriers moved
their operations to DFW.'8 Dallas, Fort Worth, and the DFW
Board responded by suing Southwest in the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Texas."M They sought a de-
claratory judgment authorizing them to exclude Southwest from
Love Field after the opening of DFW. Southwest counter-
12 See Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1020.
13 See id.; see also In re The City of Dallas, 977 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1998, orig. proceeding); Airport Coach Serv., Inc. v. City of Fort Worth,
518 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Continental Bus.
Sys., 386 F. Supp. at 361.
'4 See Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1020.
15 See id.; see also In re The City of Dallas, 977 S.W.2d at 800-01.
16 See Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1021.
'7 See id. at 1021.
is See id.; see also Allen, supra note 4, at 1016.
19 See Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. StIpp. at 1021.
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claimed, seeking a declaration of the right to remain at Love
Field.2"
The district court ruled in Southwest's favor, holding that it
could not be excluded from Love Field so long as Love Field
remained open, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 2' The district
court noted that while the Bond Ordinance defined the term
"Certificated Air Carrier Services" in a manner that clearly in-
cluded Southwest Airlines, it expressly exempted "air taxi" oper-
ators from the phase out requirement even though such
operators were competitors of Southwest.22 The court also ob-
served that the purely intrastate services of the eight CAB carri-
ers then operating at Love Field were also outside the scope of
the ordinance. 23 Thus, the court concluded, the Bond Ordi-
nance applied only to Southwest since-except for the specifi-
cally exempted air taxis - Southwest provided the only Texas
Aeronautics Commission certificated interstate air service to
Love Field. 24 Accordingly, the court held: "Since the phase-out
provision of the [Bond Ordinance] applies only to interstate ser-
vices provided by Southwest Airlines, and not to such interstate
services provided by others, it must be deemed to be unjustly
discriminatory. 25
For the next several years, Southwest operated intrastate
flights from Love Field to various locations within Texas.26 Op-
erating only intrastate flights, Southwest was exempt from fed-
eral regulation. But when Congress deregulated the airline
industry by enacting the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act (ADA),27
Southwest asked the CAB for authority to begin serving New Or-
leans from Love Field under the ADA's transitional automatic
market entry program. 28 The CAB granted Southwest the right
to do so, concluding the ADA preempted Fort Worth and Dallas
2 ( See id. at 1019.
21 See City of Dallas, Texas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1035
(N.D. Tex. 1973), affd, 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079
(1974); see also Diane Nor-wood, Note, Federal Aviation Act - Grant of Exclusive Right
to Operate at a Federally Funded Airport, 52J. AIR L. & COM. 1045, 1067-72 (1987);
Allen, supra note 4, at 1016-17.
22 See Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1027.
23 In other words, Dallas and Fort Worth never agreed in the Bond Ordinance
that operations at Love Field would be completely shut down.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1028.
26 See Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1023 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 907 (1991).
27 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (1994).
28 See Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1023.
226
AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
from enforcing the Bond Ordinance provision aimed at prohib-
iting interstate service at Love Field and that banning the service
proposed by Southwest would not be a valid exercise of proprie-
tary powers. 29 The CAB rejected the cities' argument that a pro-
vision in the ADA was intended to bar the CAB from authorizing
interstate service at an airport over the objections of a local air-
port proprietor. °
C. CONGRESS ENACTS THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT TO LIMIT
INTERSTATE SERVICE AT LOVE FIELD.
Congress responded to the CAB ruling by including-in a bill
further deregulating the airline industry3l-legislation that has
become known as the "Wright Amendment. '3 2 The Wright
Amendment, which applies only to Love Field, carved out a lim-
ited exception to the deregulation accomplished by the ADA.
Under the Wright Amendment, airlines are generally barred
from offering interstate service from Love Field. 3 The Wright
Amendment did not, however, ban all interstate flights. As a
compromise, Congress included provisions authorizing turn-
around service to the four states bordering on Texas and geo-
graphically unrestricted service by airlines operating aircraft
with a capacity of 56 passengers or less. 4
D. CONGRESS CLARIFIES AND MODIFIES THE
WRIGHT AMENDMENT
In 1996, Legend Airlines began making plans to provide ser-
vice at Love Field under the 56-passenger exception by recon-
figuring large aircraft to hold only 56 seats. 5 Those plans were
temporarily thwarted, however, when the CAB's successor, the
29 See id.; see also Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert.
denied 513 U.S. 945 (1994); Southwest Airlines Automatic Market Entry Investiga-
tion, 83 C.A.B 644, at 651-52 (1979).
30 See Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1023; Southwest Airlines Automatic Market Entry In-
vestigation, 83 C.A.B 644, 651-52 (1979).
31 See Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1023.
32 See INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION COMPETITION ACT OF 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980) (the amendment has never been codi-
fied). The Wright Amendment is sometimes referred to as "The Love Field
Amendment."
3" See Allen, supra note 4, at 1019-20.
34 INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION COMPETITION ACT OF 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980); see also Allen, supra note 4, at 1020.
35 See American Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't. of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 794 (5th Cir.
2000).
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Department of Transportation (DOT), ruled that the exception
applied only to aircraft originally configured to seat less than 57
passengers."!
In response, the following year, Congress enacted the Shelby
Amendment.3 7 In that legislation, Congress clarified the mean-
ing of the Wright Amendment's 56 passenger exception by spec-
ifying that airlines may provide geographically unrestricted
interstate service in full-size jets reconfigured to carry no more
than 56 passengers .3  The Shelby Amendment also specified
that in addition to the four states bordering Texas, airlines
could also provide service in any size aircraft to Kansas, Missis-
sippi, and Alabama. 9 Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama
spearheaded the new legislation, claiming that the Wright
Amendment kept fares between DFW and many U.S. cities
much higher than average and stifled free enterprise. ° Soon
after passage of the Shelby Amendment, Dallas city officials pub-
licly conceded that federal law required it to allow expanded
service at Love Field in accordance with the Shelby
Amendment.
41
III. THE CITY OF FORT WORTH FILES A STATE COURT
LAWSUIT SEEKING TO PREVENT ADDITIONAL
SERVICE AT LOVE FIELD.
The day after Congress passed the Shelby Amendment, Fort
Worth filed a state court declaratory judgment action.42 Nam-
ing the City of Dallas, the DFW Board, Legend Airlines, and
others, Fort Worth asked the court to declare that Dallas was
obligated to ban airlines at Love Field from providing the types
of service authorized under the Shelby Amendment.4 Ameri-
See id.
37 Pub. L. No. 105-66, § 337,111 Stat. 1425, 1447 (1997).
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See Hugh Aynesworth, Fort Worth, Dallas in Court After Hill Fuels Airport Debate,
WASh. TIMES, October 20, 1997 at A8.
.,1 See In re City of Dallas, 977 S.W.2d at 801.
,12 See City of Fort Worth, Texas v. City of Dallas, Texas, The Dallas Fort Worth
International Airport BoardJeffrey P. Fegan, Legend Airlines, Inc., Astraea Avia-
tion Services, Inc., d/b/a Dalfort Aviation, Mesa Airlines, Inc., Continental Air-
lines, Inc. and Continental Express, Inc., No. 48-171109-97 (48th Dist. Ct.,
Tarrant County, Tex., Oct. 10, 1997); see also Aynesworth, supra note 40, at A8.
43 Dallas and Legend Airlines moved to transfer venue arguing that although
the suit was nominally an action for declaratory relief, the plaintiffs were in truth
seeking injunctive relief and that venue was therefore mandatory in Dallas
County. Under Texas law, a suit for injunctive relief must be brought in the
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can Airlines, which is based at DFW, later intervened and joined
Fort Worth's request for declaratory relief. Fort Worth and
American subsequently added Continental Airlines and Conti-
nental Express as defendants when Continental scheduled
flights between Love Field and Cleveland, Ohio.44
As the basis of their request for declaratory relief, Fort Worth
and American relied on the Bond Ordinance requirement that
the cities take legally permissible steps to phase out service at
Love Field and GSIA and transfer such activities to DFW 5 They
contended that neither the ADA nor the Wright or Shelby
Amendments preempted the Bond Ordinance and that Dallas
was therefore obligated under the Bond Ordinance to prevent
any additional interstate service at Love Field.46
Fort Worth also relied on a purported oral agreement the cit-
ies allegedly entered into when Congress enacted the Wright
Amendment. According to Fort Worth, representatives from
Dallas and Fort Worth agreed that Dallas would ban all inter-
state passenger service to and from Love Field other than re-
stricted service to the four contiguous states. 7 Fort Worth
contended the oral agreement was an exercise of Dallas's pro-
prietary powers and could be enforced as a binding contract re-
gardless of any contrary provisions in the Shelby Amendment.4
Dallas, however, denied the existence of the oral agreement,
county of the defendant's residence. TEX. Civ. PRA\c. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.023
(Vernon 1997). Continental subsequently moved to transfer venue to Harris
County, where it is based. The trial court denied the motions to transfer, and
both the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas and the Texas Su-
preme Court affirmed that ruling. See In re The City of Dallas, 977 S.W.2d 798
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, orig. proceeding); In re Continental Airlines, Inc.,
988 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1998).
44 See In re City of Dallas, 977 S.W.2d at 802.
45 See Id., at 801.
46 See City of Fort Worth's Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively Mo-
tion for Partial Summary Judgment, City of Fort Worth, Texas, No. 48-171109-97
(48th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex., filed August 21, 1998).
47 See In re Continental Airlines, 988 S.W.2d at 735 (stating that "[a]ccording to
the City of Fort Worth, the cities agreed in the late 1970's to allow 'turn around
flights' to states adjacent to Texas from Love Field."). See also City of Fort Worth's
Third Amended Petition at 13, City of Fort Worth, Texas, No. 48-171109-97 (48th
Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex., filed May 19, 1998).
48 See City of Fort Worth's Third Amended Petition at 20, City of Fort Worth,
Texas, No. 48-171109-97 (48th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex., filed May 19,
1998).
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pointing out that no official action of either city approved or
even mentioned it.49
A. THE STATE COURT REFUSES TO DEFER TO THE DOT
Despite the lawsuit, Legend Airlines proceeded with its plans
to begin providing interstate passenger service at Love Field, ap-
plying to the DOT for a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity.5 ' An air carrier may not provide interstate airline ser-
vices without first obtaining DOT certification, a process that re-
quires the DOT to determine whether to authorize an airline to
provide its proposed service." Legend's application required
the DOT to determine whether and under what circumstances
federal law-namely the ADA and the Wright and Shelby
Amendments-authorizes an air carrier to provide interstate
service at Love Field.12 Accordingly, Legend requested that the
state court sever it from the lawsuit and defer to the DOT by
abating the severed portion of the case under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.53
1. The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Under Texas and federal law, the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion is triggered when a court and an agency have concurrent
original jurisdiction over a dispute.54 Primary jurisdiction is the
49 See City of Dallas' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment,
City of Fort Worth, Texas, No. 48-171109-97 (48th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex.,
filed September 18, 1998). A Dallas City Attorney who was assigned to serve as
legal counsel for DFW Airport Board in 1979 testified by affidavit that Dallas and
Fort Worth never entered into an oral agreement. See City of Dallas' Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at Ex. 21, City of Fort Worth, Texas, No.
48-171109-97 (48th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex., filed September 18, 1998)
50 Application of Legend Airlines, Inc. for a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity, Docket No. OST-1998-3667-1 (U. S. Dep't of Transp., filed March
25, 1998).
51 See 49 U.S.C. § 41102 (1994). See generally, J.E. Keefe, Jr., Annotation, Car-
rier's Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, Franchise or Permit as Subject to Transfer or
Encumbrance, 15 A.L.R. 2D 883 (1951).
52 Fort Worth contested Legend's application on the grounds that airlines are
barred from providing interstate service at Love Field as proposed by Legend. See
Answer of the City of Fort Worth in Opposition to the Application of Legend
Airlines, Docket No. OST-98-3667-2 (U.S. Dept. of Transp., filed April 22, 1998).
53 See Legend Airlines, Inc.'s Plea in Abatement and Motion to Sever, City of
Fort Worth, Texas, No. 48-171109-97 (48th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex., filed
June 29, 1998).
54 See Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993); New England Legal Found. v.
Massachusetts Port Auth., 883 F.2d 157, 171, 173 (1st Cir. 1989); Cash Am. Int'l,
Inc. v. Bennet, 43 Tex. Sup. Ct.J. 1047, 1050 (July 8, 2000); Am. Pawn and Jew-
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principle that determines whether the court or the agency
should make the initial decision.55 The purpose behind the
doctrine is to ensure that the administrative agency will not be
bypassed in a matter committed to it by Congress or the legisla-
ture. 56 Thus, when issues are pending before both a court and
an agency, the agency should generally be permitted to make
the initial decision if the dispute requires the resolution of is-
sues that are within the special competence of the agency." Pri-
mary jurisdiction also comes into play when uniformity of ruling
is essential to comply with the purposes of the statute
administered.58
Thus, the principles of primary jurisdiction dictate that courts
should not adjudicate a controversy within the jurisdiction of an
administrative agency before the agency makes its decision: (1)
where the question demands the exercise of sound administra-
tive discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact; or (2) where uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered. 9 Even if the agency cannot grant the same relief
sought in the court, the doctrine nevertheless applies if the
agency has the power to make incidental findings that may lead
to the granting of relief in a laterjudicial action.6" For example,
the Texas Supreme Court has acknowledged the doctrine ap-
plies even though the lawsuit was for damages and the agency
could not award damages.6
elry, Inc. v. Kayal, 923 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ
denied).
55 See id.; see generally Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037
(1964).
56 See id.; see also Jordan v. Staff Water Supply Corp., 919 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1996, no writ).
57 See Reiter, 507 U.S. at 268; Cash Am., Int'l, 43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1050-51;
Kayal, 923 S.W.2d at 673.
58 See Cash Am., Int'l, 43 Tex. Sup. Ct.J. at 1051.
. See id.; see also Lens Express, Inc. v. Ewald, 907 S.W.2d 64, 71 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1995, no writ).
6o See Kayal, 923 S.W.2d at 674; see also State Bar of Tex. v. McGee, 972 S.W.2d
770, 772 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
61 SeeForee v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 431 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex. 1968).
2000]
232 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
2. The State Court Refuses to Apply the Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction
Legend argued that the state court should defer under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction because there was a substantial
overlap in the issues before the DOT in the certification pro-
ceeding and the issues before the state court. 62 The state court
disagreed and denied Legend's motion for severance and abate-
ment.63 Legend's subsequent attempts to secure mandamus re-
lief from the appellate courts were also unsuccessful.64
Subsequently, the DOT initiated a separate proceeding styled
"Love Field Service Interpretation Proceeding."65 In its order
initiating the Love Field proceeding, the DOT specifically re-
ferred to the state court case and declared that the DOT would
address virtually all of the controlling issues involved in the state
court case.6" Legend therefore renewed its request that the
state court abate the proceedings under the primary jurisdiction
doctrine. 67 Once more, the trial court refused," and subse-
quent attempts to secure mandamus relief were again unsuccess-
ful. 69 The stage was thus set for conflicting rulings by the state
court and the DOT.y°
62 See Legend Airlines, Inc.'s Plea in Abatement and Motion to Sever at 4-7, City
of Fort Worth, Texas, No. 48-171109-97 (48th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex., filed
June 29, 1998).
61 See Order on Legend Airlines, Inc.'s Plea in Abatement and Motion to Sever,
City of Fort Worth, Texas, No. 48-171109-97 (48th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex.,
dated July 13, 1998).
64 See In re: Legend Airlines, Inc., No. 2-98-209-CV (Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals, filed July 16, 1998); In re: Legend Airlines, Inc., No. 98-0709 (Supreme
Court of Texas, filed July 22, 1998). Both courts denied Legend's petitions for
writ of mandamus without issuing opinions.
(35 See Love Field Service Interpretation Proceeding, U.S. Dept. of Transp., Or-
der No. 98-8-29 (Aug. 25, 1998).
66 See id. at 3-5.
67 See Legend Airlines, Inc.'s Second Plea in Abatement Concerning Federal
Administrative Action, City of Fort Worth, Texas, No. 48-171109-97 (48th Dist. Ct.,
Tarrant County, Tex., filed Sept. 4, 1998).
( Order on Legend Airlines, Inc.'s Second Plea in Abatement Concerning
Federal Administrative Action, City of Fort Worth, Texas, No. 48-171109-97 (48th
Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex., dated Sept. 18, 1998).
69 See In re: Legend Airlines, Inc. No. 2-98-288-CV (Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals, filed Sept. 23, 1998 ); In re: Legend Airlines, Inc. No. 98-0974 (Supreme
Court of Texas, filed October 6, 1998). Both courts denied Legend's petitions
for writ of mandamus without issuing an opinion.
71 The state court's refusal to defer to the DOT prolonged -at the expense of
the parties and contrary to the principles ofjudicial economy - what ultimately
proved to be an unnecessary proceeding. As discussed later, the state court of
appeals: 1) abated the appeal from the state court judgment in light of the ap-
AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
B. THE STATE COURT RULES THAT DALLAS MUST BAN
ADDITIONAL SERVICE AT LOVE FIELD
Slightly more than a year after Fort Worth filed suit, the state
court granted Fort Worth's and American's motions for sum-
mary judgment and denied those filed by Dallas, Continental
Airlines, and Continental Express.7 In its subsequent final
judgment, the court found, among other things, that:
1. the Bond Ordinance is not preempted by federal law; Dallas
and Fort Worth agreed not to enforce the Bond Ordinance to
prevent service-as authorized by the Wright Amendment-
from Love Field to points within Texas and the four border
states;
2. Dallas is a multi-airport proprietor with a federally reserved
proprietary right and power to restrict scheduled passenger ser-
vice at Love Field to points within Texas and the four border
states;
3. and the ADA, Wright, and Shelby Amendments do not convey
affirmative rights that allow interstate passenger service from
Love Field to points beyond Texas and its four border states.7 2
Based on those findings, the court declared that Dallas was
obligated to impose a perimeter rule by prohibiting any sched-
uled interstate passenger service to or from Love Field to points
beyond the four states bordering on Texas and that failure to do
so would violate the Bond Ordinance.73 In other words, the
court held that Dallas was required to prohibit the types of ser-
vice Congress had expressly authorized in the Shelby
Amendment.
IV. THE DOT RULES THAT DALLAS MUST PERMIT
ADDITIONAL SERVICE AT LOVE FIELD
A week after the state court rendered its final judgment, the
DOT announced its ruling in the Love Field Service Interpreta-
peal of the DOT order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit;
and 2) subsequently reversed the state court judgment after observing it was re-
quired to give controlling weight to the DOT's reasonable conclusions, particu-
larly in view of the Fifth Circuit's affirmance of the DOT order.
71 See City of Fort Worth, Texas, No. 48-171109-97 (48th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County,
Tex., Oct. 15, 1998).
72 See City of Fort Worth, Texas, No. 48-171109-97 (48th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County,
Tex., Dec. 16, 1998).
73 See id.
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tion Proceeding.74 After determining it had both the authority
and the responsibility to address the issues involved in the dis-
pute pending in the state court, the DOT found that "the re-
strictions on Love Field service sought by Fort Worth, American
Airlines, and the DFW Board are contrary to federal law....
The DOT also found that the Wright and Shelby Amend-
ments permit geographically unrestricted longhaul service with
aircraft having a capacity of 56 passengers or less.76 Based on
those findings, the DOT concluded that "the City of Fort Worth
may not enforce any commitment by the City of Dallas under
the Bond Ordinance or other agreement to limit operations at
Love Field authorized by federal law, and the proprietary powers
of the City of Dallas do not allow it to restrict services at Love
Field authorized by federal law."7 7
The DOT also ruled, among other things, that:
1. the Wright and Shelby Amendments preempt the ability of
Dallas to limit the type of airline service operated at Love Field;
2. the 1978 federal Airline Deregulation Act preempts the ability
of Dallas to limit the type of airline service operated at Love
Field; and
3. any airline operating aircraft with a passenger capacity of no
more than 56 passengers and a gross aircraft weight of no more
than 300,000 pounds may operate service of any length from or
to Love Field, notwithstanding any claim that such service vio-
lates any agreement between the Cities of Dallas and Fort
Worth.7
In short, the DOT order directly conflicted with the state
court judgment-the outcome Legend had attempted to pre-
vent by invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
V. THE PARTIES APPEAL THE STATE COURT
JUDGMENT AND THE DOT RULING
Fort Worth, American Airlines, and the DFW Board appealed
the DOT ruling to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.7 "M Likewise, Dallas, Legend, and the other defendants in
74 Love Field Service Interpretation Proceeding, U.S. Dept. of Transp., Order
No. 98-12-27 (Dec. 23, 1998).
75 See id. at 2.
76 See id.
77 See id. at 58-59.
78 See id.
79 See American Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't. of Transp., 202 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2740 (June 29, 2000).
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the state court lawsuit appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Second District of Texas.80 Initially, it appeared there might be
a race to judgment when the state appellate court ordered the
parties to present arguments a week before the Fifth Circuit ar-
guments."' A month after hearing oral argument, however, the
state appellate court issued an order staying the appeal pending
a ruling by the Fifth Circuit.
2
A. AMERiCAN AIRLINES, INC. V. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION-THE FEDERAL APPEAL
Six months after oral argument, the Fifth Circuit issued an
opinion in which it held that the DOT had, in all respects, cor-
rectly resolved the issues before it. Before reaching the substan-
tive issues, however, the court first rejected two challenges to the
DOT order based on federalism principles and addressed the
issue of the appropriate standard of review for the DOT ruling.8
1. Federalism Issues
Because the DOT issued its ruling after the Texas state court
had already addressed many of the same issues, the Fort Worth
Petitioners 4 argued that the DOT violated the federal full faith
and credit statute 5 and the Anti-Injunction Act.8 6 Under those
statutes, they argued, the DOT was required to give preclusive
effect to the prior state court ruling.87
80 See Legend Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 23 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth, 2000, no pet.).
81 See Legend Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-99-00098-CV (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth, June 15, 1999) (order scheduling oral argument).
82 See Legend Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-99-00098-CV (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth, Nov. 2, 1999) (order staying appeal).
83 The court's determination of various procedural challenges under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and National Environmental Policy Act are beyond
the scope of this article and will not be addressed.
84 The Fifth Circuit collectively referred to Fort Worth, the DFW Board, and
American Airlines as the "Fort Worth Petitioners." American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d
at 709.
85 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
86 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
87 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 799.
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a. Full Faith and Credit
The full faith and credit statute generally requires federal
courts to give preclusive effect to a state court judgment."8 Be-
cause the statute limits its application to federal courts, however,
the Fifth Circuit held that it did not apply to the DOT. 9 The
court noted that the only other circuit to address this question
had reached the same conclusionY The court also observed
that the Supreme Court had previously construed the statute's
references to "courts" as not including "agencies."91
The court did not, however, end its full faith and credit analy-
sis there. It also considered whether the policies favoring full
faith and credit - including repose and federalism concerns -
required application of a federal common-law rule of preclu-
sion." Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the compet-
ing policy considerations weighed against preclusion for three
reasons.
First, the policy of repose was not controlling because the
DOT proceedings were already underway when the state court
issued its ruling."" Second, the case involved interstate aviation,
an area dominated by federal concerns that the DOT is charged
with representing.9 4 Also, the case involved Love Field, and
Congress had twice enacted legislation specifically tailored to
that airport. Finally, the court concluded that applying fulll faith
and credit principles would lead to inconsistent results. Some of
the parties before the DOT were not involved in the state court
case, and granting preclusive effect to the state court judgment
would lead to inconsistent application of the Shelby Amend-
ment to the parties that did not appear before the state court."
b. Anti-Injunction Act
The court also rejected the Anti-Injunction Act challenge to
the DOT's order. " The Fort Worth Petitioners argued that the
Il See In re General Motors Corp Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tanks Prod. Liability
Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 141-42 (3rd Cir. 1997); see also James P. George, Parallel Liti-
gation, 51 BAYLOR L. REv. 769, 888 (1999).
89 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 799.
See NLRB v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 930 F.2d 316, 320 (3rd Cir. 1991).
See Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986).
92 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 800.
'93 See id.
1)" See id. at 800-01.
95 See id. at 801.
!( See id. at 802.
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DOT's declaratory order had the same effect as an injunction
and therefore fell within the scope of the act, which generally
provides that a federal court may not enjoin state court proceed-
ings. 7 The court found that argument unpersuasive for two rea-
sons. First, DOT proceedings are exempt from the Anti-
Injunction Act because it applies only to proceedings in a "court
of the United States." 8 Second, even where an action is pend-
ing in a federal court, an agency's presence as a party, together
with the federal interest the agency represents, trumps the Anti-
Injunction Act. 9
The court also rejected the Fort Worth Petitioners' arguments
based on Justice Rehnquist's dissent from the denial of certio-
rari in United Credit Bureau of America, Inc. v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board. °° There, the NLRB had ordered a party to dismiss a
state court action without considering whether the state-court
proceeding interfered with the NLRB's ability to consider or dis-
pose of the matters before it. Dissenting from the Court's de-
nial of certiorari, Justice Rehnquist expressed the view that the
concerns of federalism and comity embodied in the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act should apply to a federal agency-the NLRB.
The Fifth Circuit distinguished United Credit, explaining that
in the pending case, "the state court action, at least at the trial
level, was completed, thus lessening DOT's intrusion and
strengthening own reasons for issuing its own interpretation of
the legal issues."'0 1 Moreover, observed the court, the DOT's
interest was not in resolving an individual petitioner's claim but
instead in avoiding piecemeal application of a federal aviation
statute. 102
2. Standard of Review for DOT Interpretation of the Airline
Deregulation Act
Before embarking on its review of the DOT ruling, the Fifth
Circuit addressed the parties' dispute over the proper standard
97 See In re General Motors Corp., 134 F.3d at 143-44; see also George, supra note
88, at 881.
98 See In re General Motors Corp., 134 F.3d at 143-44; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1994).
99 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 802; see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 235-36 (1972); Texas v. United States, 837 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 1988).
100 454 U.S. 994 (1981).
101 American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 802-03.
102 See id. at 803.
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of review for the DOT's interpretation of the ADA.' In the
end, the court chose not resolve the issue because it concluded
that the DOT's decision withstood scrutiny under both the def-
erential standard of review for administrative agency rulings
enunciated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Counsel, Inc.'0 4 and the more exacting de novo standard of re-
view.'0 5 Nevertheless, because it left the issue for another day, it
is useful to examine the court's discussion of the arguments ad-
vanced by the parties.
The Fort Worth Petitioners contended that the DOT's inter-
pretation of the proprietary powers exception should be af-
forded no deference because the DOT lacks both the authority
and the expertise to interpret that section of the ADA, argu-
ments the Fifth Circuit characterized as "strong."'0 6 The Fifth
Circuit agreed that a preemption determination involves legal
issues arguably more within the expertise of the courts. 07 The
court also noted that in reaching its decision, the DOT inter-
preted existing case law, a role more typically left to the judici-
ary. Additionally, the court observed, the task of defining what
constitutes a proprietary power has traditionally been left to the
judiciary.'0 8 Finally, the court suggested that Congress might
have intended to codify the proprietary powers existing when
the ADA was enacted, rather than intending to allow the DOT
to define proprietary rights. 109
The DOT, on the other hand, emphasized the Supreme
Court's recognition that the DOT is charged with administering
the aviation laws as a whole. 0 More significantly, the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted, the DOT is the "superintending agency" assigned to
administer the ADA."' And, the court observed, the First Cir-
cuit has "come close" to holding that this power encompasses
103 See id. at 804-05.
104 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
105 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 805.
106 See id. at 804.
107 See id; see generally Patricia G. Chapman, Has the Chevron Doctrine Run Out of
Gas? Senza Ripieni Use of Chevron Deference or the Rule of Lenity, 19 Miss. C. L. REV.
115 (1998); Russell L. Weaver & Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency Interpre-
tations of Regulations: A Post-Chevron Assessment, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 411 (1992).
108 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 804.
109 See id. at 805.
110 See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Michigan, 510 U.S. 355,
366-67 (1994) ("The Secretary of Transportation is charged with administering
the federal aviation laws .... ).
I See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 805 (citing American Airlines, Inc v.
Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 229 n.6 (1995)).
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the authority to interpret the preemption section of the ADA. 112
The Fifth Circuit concluded its discussion by stating that it was
"nearly persuaded that DOT possesses the authority to interpret
the preemption provision of the ADA and that, consequently,
we should defer to its interpretation of that provision." '1 13
3. ADA Preemption
a. Legislative History of the ADA
Turning to the substantive preemption issues, the Fifth Cir-
cuit began its analysis with a brief review of the ADA's legislative
history. 114 Congress, the court observed, enacted the ADA in
1978 to end federal economic regulation of commercial aviation
and to promote competition in the airline industry.11 5 To
achieve that goal, it included within the act a preemption provi-
sion designed to "prevent the states from frustrating the goals of
deregulation by establishing or maintaining economic regula-
tions of their own .... ,"'6 The preemption provision provides:
Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political subdivi-
sion of a state, or political authority of at least 2 States may not
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an
air carrier that may provide air transportation under this
subpart.' 17
The Fifth Circuit also recognized, however, that Congress in-
tended to reserve some powers to airport proprietors, a goal it
sought to achieve by including a limited exception to the pre-
emption provision-the proprietary powers provision. In that
provision, Congress specified that the preemptive effect of the
ADA does "not limit a State, political subdivision of a State, or
political authority of at least 2 States that owns or operates an
112 See id. (citing New England Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 883
F.2d 157, 167 (1st Cir. 1989)).
113 Id.
114 See generally Calvin Davison and Lorraine B. Halloway, The Two Faces of Sec-
tion 105 - Airline Shield or Airport Sword, 56J. AIR L. & COM. 93, 106-110 (1990).
115 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 805. See also Leonard A. Ceruzzi,
Quasi-Regulation of a Deregulated Industry By A Safety Agency, 54J. AIR L. & CoM. 889,
891-93 (1989).
116 Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 335 (5th Cir. 1995). See generally
Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of§ 105 Airline Deregula-
tion Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 41713), Pertaining to Preemption of Authority over Prices, Routes,
and Services, 149 A.L.R. FEl. 299 (1998).
117 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1997).
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airport . from carrying out its proprietary powers and
rights."" 8 Congress recognized, the court explained, that "air-
port proprietors-the majority of which are municipalities-
were best equipped to handle local problems arising at and
around their facilities."' 9
b. Interpretation and Application of the ADA
Having summarized the legislative history and congressional
intent behind the ADA's preemption provision and its proprie-
tary powers exception, the Fifth Circuit swiftly dispatched any
notion that the preemption provision was not implicated by the
restrictions in the Bond Ordinance: "The restrictions on service
at Love Field under the Ordinance appear to operate as limita-
tions 'relating to ... routes' within the meaning of [the preemp-
tion provision], and the parties present no significant argument
to the contrary."' 120 Consequently, the court limited its analysis
to the issue of whether enforcement of the Bond Ordinance re-
strictions on service at Love Field would be a valid exercise of
Dallas's proprietary powers.
(i) The Scope of the Proprietary Powers Provision Under Prior
Decisions
Although the court prefaced its analysis by observing that "the
precise scope of an airport owner's proprietary powers has not
yet been clearly articulated by any court,"1 2 1 it nevertheless
found guidance in several cases examining when an airport
owner's enactment of a "perimeter rule" or similar route restric-
tion falls within the proprietary powers exception. The court
turned its attention to perimeter rule cases because it concluded
that both the Wright Amendment and the Bond Ordinance act
as perimeter rules.'22
- 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(3) (1997).
H9 American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 805 (citation omitted).
120 Id. (citation omitted). The court's speedy determination that the Bond Or-
dinance implicated the ADA's preemption provision reflects the Supreme
Court's admonition that ADA preemption is expansive. See Morales v. Trans-
World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992). See also Craig M. Fullen, Note, 23
RUTGERS L.J. 427, 437 (1992) (discussing Morales). But see John T. Houchin,
Note, Harris v. American Airlines: Flying Through the Turbulence of Federal Preemption
and The Airline Deregulation Act, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 955 (1997) (criticizing overly-
broad application of ADA preemption).
121 American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 806.
122 See id. at 806 n.13.
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Courts addressing perimeter rule cases, the Fifth Circuit
noted, have stressed that local proprietors play an "extremely
limited" role in the regulation of aviation. 21 Moreover, the
court emphasized, when defining the permissible scope of a pro-
prietor's power to regulate under the proprietary powers excep-
tion, federal courts have repeatedly held that an airport
proprietor can impose only "reasonable, nonarbitrary, and non-
discriminatory rules that advance the local interest."'124 Thus,
courts have held that airport proprietors are vested only with the
power to issue regulations targeting local environmental con-
cerns, such as noise.1 25 To date, the Fifth Circuit explained, the
types of local regulations that have been permitted are those
aimed at: (1) monitoring noise levels; 126 (2) tempering environ-
mental concerns; 1 27 and (3) managing congestion. 28
In each of those cases, observed the court, the proposed re-
striction was targeted at alleviating an existing problem at the
airport or in the surrounding neighborhood. 12 Thus, the Sec-
ond Circuit approved a perimeter rule at La Guardia Airport as
a reasonable means of both alleviating congestion and preserv-
ing the airport's shorthaul status. 3 ' And in a later case involv-
ing restrictions on the use of a heliport,' the Second Circuit
allowed only the restrictions aimed at reducing noise or other
environmental concerns and struck down those restricting sight-
seeing routes because: "Congress, the Supreme Court, and we
123 See id. at 806.
124 See id. (citing Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York and New
Jersey, 658 F. Supp. 953, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); National Helicopter Corp. of
America v. City of New York, 137 F.3d 81, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1998)).
125 See National Helicopter, 137 F.3d at 88-89; British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth.,
558 F.2d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 1977); City and County of San Francisco v. FAA, 942 F.2d
1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990). See generally Robert Hardaway, Economics of Airport
Regulation, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 47, 72 (1991); Richard W. Danforth, The Airport Noise
Abatement Powers of the Federal Government and Airport Owners: The FAA 's Checklist, 5
AiR & SPACE LAW. 3 (1990); Thomas W. Anderson and PamelaJ. Rasmussen, Re-
cent Developments in Airport Law, 22 URiS. LAw. 899, 915 (1990).
126 See Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, 659 F.2d 100, 104
(9th Cir. 1981).
127 See National Helicopter, 137 F.3d at 88.
128 See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 817
F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987).
129 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 806.
130 See Western Air Lines, 817 F.2d at 226.
131 See National Helicopter, 137 F.3d 81.
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have consistently stated that the law controlling flight paths
through navigable airspace is completely preempted."' 13 2
The Fifth Circuit found only one case supporting the Fort
Worth Petitioners' view of the scope of an airport operator's
proprietary powers-Arapahoe County Public Airport v. Centennial
Express Airlines, Inc.3 ' In Arapahoe, the Colorado Supreme Court
approved a municipal proprietor's ban on all passenger service
at Centennial Airport in Denver without finding any purpose for
the restriction beyond what the Fifth Circuit referred to as the
proprietor's "bald assertion" that it would strip the airport au-
thority of its ability and authority to manage the airport. 4
The court brushed the Arapahoe case aside, explaining that
under the Colorado Supreme Court's reasoning, virtually any re-
gional regulation enacted by a proprietor would fall within the
proprietary powers exception and expand the regulatory role of
municipal owners far beyond the extremely limited role envi-
sioned by the ADA.135 The court also noted that Arapahoe was
factually distinguishable because the Colorado Supreme Court
found that-unlike the Bond Ordinance-the ban on passenger
service did not constitute a restriction on "rates, routes or ser-
vices" within the meaning of the ADA.136 Additionally, unlike
Love Field, passenger service had never been permitted at
1' Id. at 92. See also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303
(1944) Uackson,J, concurring) ("Congress has recognized the national responsi-
bility for regulating air commerce. Federal control is intensive and exclusive.");
New York Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. 1435, 1442 (D. Mass. 1985)
("[C]ourts have recognized the predominance of federal interests in the regula-
tion of aviation."); Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Nebraska Dep't. of Aeronautics, 122 N.W.2d
476, 488 (Neb. 1963) ("It appears Congress has preempted the field of interstate
air transportation in regard to the routes and points to be served by interstate air
carriers to the exclusion of conflicting regulations by the states.").
133 956 P.2d 587 (Col. 1998).
134 See id. at 591, 595.
35 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 807. The Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) concluded that Arapahoe was incorrectly decided because the airport
proprietor's goal of promoting service at Denver International Airport was not a
legitimate basis for blocking Centennial Express from using Centennial Airport.
The FAA also determined that the airport proprietor's ban on scheduled service
was a form of route regulation prohibited by the ADA preemption provision. See
Centennial Express Airlines v. Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority, U.S.
Dep't. of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Director's Determina-
tion, Docket No. 16-98-05 at 19-32 (August 21, 1998).
131 See id. at 807 n.15. But see Centennial Express Airlines, Federal Aviation Ad-
minstration, Director's Determination, Docket No. 16-98-05 at 28-29 (August 21,
1998) (concluding that ban on passenger service at Centennial was a route regu-
lation barred by the ADA's preemption provision).
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Centennial Airport, a factor the Colorado Supreme Court
weighed heavily in its holding. 13 7
(ii) The Bond Ordinance Restrictions Do Not Fit Within Existing
Case Law
Based on its survey of case law, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the Bond Ordinance restrictions on Love Field service did
not fit within the framework of existing federal case law defining
the scope of proprietary rights. On its face, the court stated, the
Bond Ordinance was clearly not aimed at alleviating noise, pol-
lution, or congestion.'38 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit rejected the
Fort Worth Petitioners' attempts to extract from two prior pe-
rimeter rule cases' 39 what the court called "an overly broad rule
that it is within an airport owner's proprietary powers to allocate
traffic between two airports so as to preserve the shorthaul na-
ture of one facility."14 The court explained that in both of
those cases, the perimeter rules-although designed to allocate
traffic between airports-were permissible only because they
were intended to address local concerns such as congestion or
overuse of one airport: "In neither case was reallocation of
flights between airports a goal in and of itself.'' 41
b. The Bond Ordinance Restrictions Are Not Justified by
Permissible Local Concerns
The Fifth Circuit did not strike down the restrictions in the
Bond Ordinance merely because they did not fit within the
framework of existing case law. Citing authority suggesting that
the proprietary powers provision is not limited to the regulation
137 See id.
138 See id. at 807.
139 See Western Air Lines, 817 F.2d 222; City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184
(5th Cir. 1982). The court distinguished its holding in City of Houston. See Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 807 n.14. In City of Houston, the Fifth Circuit upheld
the FAA's authority to enact a perimeter rule at Washington National Airport.
The FAA implemented the perimeter rule to limit traffic at National, preserve
the shorthaul status of the airport, and assure the use of the flagging Dulles Air-
port nearby. But, the Fifth Circuit explained, in relying on City of Houston, the
Fort Worth Petitioners overlooked the fact that the court explicitly avoided en-
gaging in a full analysis of the ADA's preemption provision and instead held that
the ADA preemption provision did not apply to the FAA.
140 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 807.
141 Id.; see also Allen, supra note 4, at 1023-32.
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of noise, 42 the court stated, "we are open to assessing whether
the restrictions in the Ordinance are reasonable and non-dis-
criminatory rules aimed at advancing a previously unrecognized
local interest."' 143 Despite that willingness to consider other jus-
tifications for an airport perimeter rule, however, the court
promptly concluded that the Fort Worth Petitioners had not of-
fered any viable alternative justification for route limitations. 44
To allow a perimeter rule designed solely to allocate traffic be-
tween two airports so as to preserve the shorthaul nature of one
facility, the court explained, would extend the proprietary pow-
ers exception beyond its limited reach.' 41
4. The Wright Amendment's "Commuter Aircraft Exemption"
The Fort Worth Petitioners also challenged the DOT's ruling
that the "commuter aircraft exemption" in the Wright Amend-
ment-as clarified in the Shelby Amendment - permits any air-
line operating aircraft with a passenger capacity of no more than
56 passengers and a gross aircraft weight of no more than
300,000 pounds to provide geographically unrestricted service
from or to Love Field. 146 They contended that the exemption
authorizes only short-haul service at Love Field. Applying the
deferential Chevron standard,'47 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
DOT's determination. 148
The starting point for the court's analysis was the relevant stat-
utory language. 14  Under the Wright Amendment, the general
ban on interstate flights at Love Field does not apply to "air
transportation provided by commuter airlines operating aircraft
with a passenger capacity of 56 passengers or less."'151 Under the
1,12 See Western Air Lines, 658 F. Supp. at 957 ("Section 1305(b)(1) [recodified as
41713(b)(1)] does not expressly limit proprietary powers to the regulation of
noise, although Congress would have so limited the section if that is what it had
in mind.").
3'l American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 808.
I,'4 See id.
1,15 See id.
14, Love Field Service Interpretation Proceeding, U.S. Dep't. of Transporta-
tion, Order No. 98-12-27 (Dec. 23, 1998).
1-7 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 808 (the court applied the Chevron
analysis because "the DOT is authorized to administer the Wright and Shelby
Amendments") (citing Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444,
1449 (5th Cir. 1988)).
1,18 See id. at 810.
kw See id. at 808-09.
150 INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION COMPETITION ACT OF 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-192, §29, 94 Stat. 35, 48 (1980).
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Shelby Amendment, the term "passenger capacity of 56 passen-
gers or less" is defined to include "any aircraft ... reconfigured
to accommodate 56 passengers or fewer if the total number of
passenger seats installed on the aircraft does not exceed 56."'
15 1
According to the court, a plain reading of these provisions per-
mits longhaul service at Love Field by commuter airlines operat-
ing aircraft with a passenger capacity of fewer than 57. 152
The more complicated issue, the court explained, was the
type of aircraft the commuter airline exemption covers.' 53 The
DOT ruled that the exemption applies to any aircraft with fewer
than 57 seats-whether a regional jet or turboprop plane. 51
The Fort Worth Petitioners, however, argued that the exemp-
tion applies only to "commuter aircraft," a term that it con-
tended does not include regional jets. Those differing views,
and the Congress' failure to define the term "commuter air-
line," convinced the Fifth Circuit that the term is ambiguous.
55
Asserting somewhat different arguments, Fort Worth and
American urged the court to hold that the DOT should have
interpreted "commuter airline" as a limitation. 156 American Air-
lines's position was that the term "commuter airline" cannot re-
fer to an air carrier offering longhaul service, an argument
previously rejected by the federal Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit. 157 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the
District of Columbia Circuit's conclusion that the commuter air-
lines exemption restricts the type of aircraft that may operate at
Love Field, not the class of airlines. 15
Fort Worth's argument-that the term "commuter" limits the
type of aircraft-was premised on the fact that when the Wright
Amendment was enacted, commuter aircraft were turboprop
planes. Thus, it argued, regional jets cannot qualify as "com-
muter" aircraft. 59 Again, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, noting
that when Congress enacted the Wright Amendment in 1979, it
151 Pub. L. No. 105-66, 111 Stat. 1425, 1447 (1997).
152 American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 809.
153 See id.
154 Love Field Service Interpretation Proceeding, U.S. Dep't. of Transporta-
tion, Order No. 98-12-27 (Dec. 23, 1998).
155 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 809 (citing Continental Air Lines, 843
F.2d at 1454 ("The language of the [commuter airline exemption] is, we are
persuaded, ambiguous.")).
15 See id.
157 See Continental AirLines, 843 F.2d at 1454-55.
158 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 809.
159 See id.
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did not define "commuter airline" by referring to the types of
aircraft with a limited passenger capacity in use at that time. 160
To impose such a restriction, the court noted, would penalize
airlines that updated their technology as the airline industry ad-
vanced during the past twenty years. 61
Additionally, explained the court, the Fort Worth Petitioners'
definition of "commuter airline" would render the Shelby
Amendment meaningless. 162 According to Fort Worth, the
Shelby Amendment merely permits the use of reconfigured jet
aircraft if the aircraft otherwise qualified as a commuter aircraft,
a view the court characterized as nonsensical. Under that view,
a reconfiguredjet would never qualify as a commuter plane. In-
stead, the court observed, the more rational view is that the
Shelby Amendment's phrase "operating aircraft with a passen-
ger capacity of 56 passengers or less" defines the term "com-
muter airlines" so as to include all planes weighing less than
300,000 pounds, including regional jets, with a passenger capac-
ity of less than 57. Hence, under the court's reading of the com-
muter aircraft exemption, the DOT's ruling that carriers using
jets with a 56 passenger capacity may engage in longhaul service
at Love Field survived scrutiny under the Chevron standard. 163
5. Enforceability of the Use Agreements
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether the ADA
preempts enforcement of the use agreements, i.e., the agree-
ments under which the airlines serving the Dallas-Fort Worth
area agreed to move their operations to DFW.164 The DOT de-
termined that the DFW Board could not prohibit or limit an
airline's use of a competing airport through the use
agreements.165
At the outset, the court described the two types of action a
state or municipality takes in a proprietary capacity: (1) actions
similar to those a private entity might take; and (2) actions a
state or municipality takes that are attempts to regulate. Actions
160 See id. (citing Continental Air Lines, 843 F.2d at 1454).
161 See id.
162 Id.
163 See id. at 810.
164 See id; see also Christopher R. Rowley, Financing Airport Capital Development:
The Aviation Industsy's Greatest Challenge, 63J. AIR L. & COM. 605, 615 (1998) (gen-
erally discussing airline use agreements).
165 Love Field Service Interpretation Proceeding, U.S. Dep't. of Transporta-
tion, Order No. 98-12-27 at 52 (Dec. 23, 1998).
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similar to those a private entity might take, the court explained,
are not subject to preemption.'"" To illustrate, the court dis-
cussed two cases, Building & Trades Council v. Assoc. Builders
1 7
and Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford,
Texas.'" 8 In Building & Trades, the Supreme Court held that a
labor contract was not preempted by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act because it was not "government regulation" but rather
"proprietary conduct."' 69 In Cardinal Towing, the Fifth Circuit
held that a contract entered into under a municipal ordinance
was not a law, regulation, or other provision having the force
and effect of law. Therefore it was not preempted because it was
a valid exercise of proprietary power rather than an impermissi-
ble attempt to regulate. 1
70
Thus, explained the court, the critical inquiry was whether the
use agreements represented a valid exercise of the cities' propri-
etary powers, a question the court ultimately found easy to re-
solve. 71 The use agreements, the court noted, are essentially
coextensive with the Bond Ordinance, indicating in their
breadth an intent to achieve everything achieved by the Bond
Ordinance. 172 They were enacted to effectuate the Bond Ordi-
nance, and the most recent version of the agreements directly
linked the airlines' obligations to the terms of the Bond Ordi-
nance: "Airline agrees that it shall conduct its Certificated Air
Carrier Services serving the Dallas/Fort Worth areas to, from
and at the Airport, to the extent required by the terms of the
1968 Regional Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance."'173
Having concluded that the use agreements were inextricably
bound up with the Bond Ordinance, the court held that they
were "preempted as an impermissible attempt to regulate in an
area where the federal government has preempted state regula-
tion.' 1 74 The court also rejected the notion that the signatories
166 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 810.
167 507 U.S. 218 (1993); see generally Kerry Courtney, The EndJustifies the Means:
Building and Construction Trades Council v. Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc.,
29 NEw ENG. L. REv. 129 (1994).
168 180 F.3d 686 (5th Cir. 1999).
169 507 U.S. at 232.
170 180 F.3d at 691, 693-94.
171 See American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 810.
172 See id. at 810-11 (citing Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 694).
173 Id. at 811.
174 Id. (citing Skydiving Ctr. of Greater Wash., D.C. v. St. Mary's County Air-
port Comm'n, 823 F. Supp. 1273, 1284 (D. Md. 1993) (finding that when federal
law preempted a municipal corporation's ban on off-site parachute landings, it
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to the use agreements had waived their preemption rights by
voluntarily entering in the agreements, holding that the ADA
preemption provision does not expressly announce affirmative
rights for airlines, but instead bars states from regulating certain
areas.' 75 Said the court: "The airline signatories cannot 'waive'
this preemption because there is no indication that the federal
preemption is limited to granting them individual rights."176
6. Through Service
As a final matter, the Fifth Circuit addressed the DOT's ruling
that the Wright Amendment permits an airline to offer through
service from Love Field to points outside the Love Field service
area as long as the airline uses a city within Texas as a connect-
ing point and a 56 passenger aircraft to get to that point. The
issue arose from Continental Express's decision to offer and ad-
vertise through service between Love Field and "the world."
Continental Express's plan was to fly passengers from Love Field
to Houston's Intercontinental Airport on aircraft with a maxi-
mum capacity of 56 passengers and then transfer them to world-
wide flights on large jets. "Passengers taking advantage of this
service would receive one ticket and, though required to change
planes, would not have to reclaim and recheck their luggage at
the connecting point. '177
Subsection (a) (2) of the Wright Amendment excludes, from
its general prohibition against interstate transportation, flights
out of Love Field that are operated on aircraft with capacity of
56 passengers or less. 178 Under subsection (c) of the Wright
Amendment, any size aircraft may be used for flights between
also preempted lease provisions between corporation and the skydiving center
that incorporated this ban by reference)).
175 This holding could have important ramifications for parties seeking to en-
join state court actions or judgments arguably preempted by the ADA. Under
the Anti-Injunction Act, a federal court may grant an injunction to stay court
proceedings where "expressly authorized by Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1994). The test "is whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right
or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity, could be given its intended
scope only by a stay of a state court proceeding." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 238 (1972). The Fifth Circuit's determination that the ADA's preemption
provision does not create a federal right would appear to preclude application of
the Anti-Injunction Act's "expressly authorized by Congress" exception.
176 Id. (citing Niswonger v. American Aviation, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 769, 771
(E.D. Tenn. 1975)).
177 See American Airlines, Inc.,202 F.3d at 812.
178 INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION COMPETITION ACT OF 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-192, §29, 94 Stat. at 48 (1980).
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Love Field and any point in Texas or one of the four contiguous
states (later expanded to seven by the Shelby Amendment) as
long as the carrier: (1) does not offer or provide any through
service or ticketing with another air carrier or foreign air car-
rier; and (2) does not offer for sale transportation to or from,
and the flight or aircraft does not serve, any point that is outside
the permissible states.'79
The DOT interpreted subsection (a) (2) as authorizing the
service offered by Continental Express. Specifically, the DOT
read the commuter airlines exception to exempt planes with a
passenger capacity of less than 57 from all restrictions in the
Wright Amendment. 8 " Thus, under the DOT's interpretation,
the restrictions on service under subsection (c)-including the
restrictions on through service-do not apply to aircraft operat-
ing under the commuter airline exemption.' 8 ' The Fort Worth
Petitioners, Dallas, and Southwest Airlines contended that the
DOT's interpretation violated the plain language of the Wright
Amendment. It was their position that the restrictions on ser-
vice in subsection (c) (2) apply to both commuter flights under
subsection (a) (2) and flights on larger aircraft. 8 2
Characterizing both readings of the statute as plausible, and
noting the lack of legislative history, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that Congress did not speak directly to the issue and therefore
moved to the second step of the Chevron analysis to inquire
whether the DOT's interpretation was reasonable. Under Chev-
ron, the court explained, an agency's interpretation is reasona-
ble if it is "'not patently inconsistent with the statutory
scheme."'" 83 The court also observed that it "need not agree
with DOT's interpretation in order to uphold it as
reasonable." 84
Although it emphasized that it did not find the DOT's inter-
pretation to be the only or the best reading of the Wright
Amendment, the court was persuaded that it was a permissible
one under Chevron.' 5 The DOT, observed the court, grounded
its ruling largely on the notion that by imposing an express re-
179 See id.
180 See Love Field Service Interpretation Proceeding, U.S. Dep't. of Transporta-
tion, Order No. 98-12-27 at 47-50 (Dec. 23, 1998).
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See American Airlines, Inc., at 813 (citing Continental, 843 F.2d at 1452).
184 Id. (citing Exxon Corp. v. Lujan, 970 F.2d 757, 761 (10th Cir. 1992)).
18.5 See id.
2000] 249
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
striction on through service on large jets operating under sub-
section (c) (2) but declining to impose a similar restriction on
commuter planes operating under (a) (2), Congress was evinc-
ing its intent to permit small aircraft to fly without such a restric-
tion."' The court concluded, "[w]e view this reading of the
amendment as reasonable and not inconsistent with the statu-
tory scheme aimed at preserving Love Field as a primarily
shorthaul facility while still allowing some longhaul service."187
The court did not depart the issue, however, without first lev-
eling the following criticisms at the DOT's reasoning. To reach
its decision, the DOT necessarily defined "air transportation on
56-passenger capacity planes" as including air service provided
in part by 56-passenger aircraft. It also implicitly defined intra-
state service as including flights with only an intrastate portion.
These interpretations, the court stated, "strain the meaning of
both terms."' 8 The court also expressed concern about the po-
tential effect of the DOT's ruling. Although the court thought
it unlikely to affect DFW's role as the Dallas area's primary
longhaul facility, it perceived a likelihood that following the
DOT's ruling, airlines already operating small aircraft would
commence interlining service connecting in Houston or an-
other Texas airport. Nevertheless, the court was willing to con-
cede that determinations of that nature were within the DOT's
expertise, rather than the court's, and therefore refused to sub-
stitute its judgment on aviation-related issues.
B. LEGEND AIRLINES, INC. v. CYITY OF FORT WORTH, TEXAS-
THE STATE COURT APPEAL
Nearly four months after the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion,
the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas ("Fort
Worth Court of Appeals"), with one justice dissenting, reversed
the state court judgment.' 9 The court held that the restrictions
in the Bond Ordinance are preempted by the ADA and that the
passenger service proposed by the defendant airlines is permissi-
ble under the Wright and Shelby Amendments.
18(i See id.
187 [d. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. 96-716, at 24 (1979), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 86 (stating that the Wright Amendment "embodies a compro-
mise which permits limited commercial passenger service in interstate transporta-
tion at Love Field.")).
188 Id.
189 See Legend Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 23 S.W.3d 83 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet denied.).
250
AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
1. A New Ingredient in the Otherwise Familiar Historical
Background
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals' overview of the develop-
ment of DFW airport and the controversies concerning Love
Field differs from those contained in the court opinions issued
in other Love Field cases in one notable respect-it discusses
the DOT's 1992 findings about the potential effect of expanded
service at Love Field. In July of 1992, the court noted, the DOT
published a study prepared by the Interdepartmental Task
Force on the Wright Amendment concerning the likely effects
of repealing or loosening the restrictions on Love Field ser-
vice.190 The study addressed a number of questions about the
relationship between Love Field and DFW.
In its report, the DOT concluded that expanding Love Field
service through modification or repeal of the Wright Amend-
ment would cause no significant harm to DFW and would
greatly benefit the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area.'9
Among other things, the DOT determined that modifying the
Wright Amendment would result in more service, more compe-
tition, and lower fares and that there would be neither an un-
controlled increase in the number of new flights from Love
Field nor an increase in noise levels. 192 The court underscored
the DOT's conclusion that, "[u] nder all possible scenarios, Dal-
las-Fort Worth Airport will continue to grow and remain the re-
gion's dominant airport."'9 3
2. Primary Jurisdiction
As a preliminary matter, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals con-
sidered whether the state court erred in refusing to abate the
case under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 14 After identi-
fying the legal principles and the policies underlying the doc-
trine, the court concluded that the federal law issues in the case
190 See id. at 88 (citing ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF CHANGES TO THE WRIGHT
AMENDMENT, INTERDEPARTMENTAL TASK FORCE ON THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT (July
1992)). The court attached the task force report as an appendix to its opinion.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See id.; see also Allen, supra note 4, at 1050-52 (observing that "DFW has
grown and prospered, now ranking as the second busiest airport in the world"
and that "[c]urrently the airport's operations are increasing at a rate of 5% per
year" and concluding "[i] t is clear, then, that DFW's long-term viability has been
established.")
194 See Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 91.
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were inherently judicial in nature.' 5 Although it conceded that
the DOT is clearly charged with administering the federal avia-
tion laws, the court found no statutory grant of authority giving
the DOT exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply either the
ADA or the Wright and Shelby Amendments.' To the con-
trary, the court observed, federal courts have routinely exercised
their jurisdiction to determine preemption issues similar to
those in the case before the court.'97 Accordingly, the court
held that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not apply to
the federal law issue before it and that the lower court did not
err by refusing to defer to the DOT.' 8
3. ADA Preemption
a. The Bond Ordinance Restrictions Relate to Routes
Next, the court turned its attention to the core issue in the
appeal-ADA preemption. Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals dispensed with an introductory review
of the ADA's legislative history and the policies underlying the
act, opting instead for a succinct synopsis of the preemption and
proprietary powers provisions and their interplay with one an-
other.'' Like the Fifth Circuit, however, the court had little dif-
ficulty concluding that the Bond Ordinance restrictions
implicated the preemption provision "because they require the
transfer of all interstate flights from Love Field and other local
airports to DFW. ''2 .. The court was thus left with but one in-
quiry: would enforcement of the restrictions constitute a valid




' See id., at 92. In a footnote, the court acknowledged the conflicting nature
of the Fifth Circuit's observations that: 1) aviation regulation is an area where
federal concerns are preeminent and that the DOT is charged with representing
those concerns; and 2) allowing the state court to foreclose the DOT from ad-
dressing the issues in this case would trump the key federal interests that moti-
vated Congress to create the DOT. See id. at 92 n.29 (citing American Airlines, Inc.,
202 F.3d at 800-01).
1991 See id.
2'00' See Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 92.
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b. The Bond Ordinance Restrictions Are Not A Valid
Exercise of Proprietary Powers
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals prefaced its analysis of the
proprietary powers issue by referencing both the DOT's deter-
mination that Dallas's proprietary powers as an airport owner
did not allow it to restrict services at Love Field authorized by
federal law and the Fifth Circuit's holding that the DOT find-
ings were reasonable.2 1 ' Nonetheless, the court emphasized
that it was not bound by the Fifth Circuit's ruling and that it was
not reviewing the validity of the DOT order.2 2
At the outset, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals invoked a fa-
miliar talisman-that preemption of state or local law by a fed-
eral statute is generally disfavored. 1 3 Preemption questions, the
court observed, call for an examination of congressional in-
tent.21 "4 Thus, the court acknowledged, preemption arises from
either express statutory language or from implied congressional
intent where the federal law occupies a field to the exclusion of
state law or where the state law actually conflicts with federal law
and stands as an obstacle to accomplishment of the purposes
and objectives of Congress.
The manifest purpose behind the ADA's preemption provi-
sion, explained the court, was to ensure that the States would
not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own. 20 6
The court also emphasized that even before the ADA was en-
acted, it was well-settled that airport proprietors play an ex-
tremely limited role in the national scheme of aviation. 0 7
Congress mandated that limited role to avoid interference with
the preeminent authority of the federal government in the field
of aviation and to prevent local airport proprietors from infring-
ing on the federal government's "turf.1120 8 Accordingly, a local
government's exercise of its proprietary rights is limited to rea-
201 See id.
202 See id. (citing Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex.
1993)).
20- See id. at 93. (citing Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,
450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981)). See also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746
(1981); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Rosario-Cordero v.
Crowley Towing & Transp. Co., 46 F.3d 120, 122 (1st Cir. 1995).
204 See Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 93. (citing Schneidwind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485
U.S. 293, 299 (1988)).
2 4) See id. (citing Schneidwind, 485 U.S. at 300).
206 See id. (citing Wolens, 513 U.S. at 222).
207 See id. (citing British Airways, 564 F.2d at 1010).
208 See id. (citing City of Houston, 679 F.2d 1194).
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sonable, nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory rules that advance
an articulated local interest. 9
Echoing the Fifth Circuit, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
noted that courts applying the foregoing principles have upheld
route restrictions imposed by local proprietors that were de-
signed to address operation and safety concerns such as noise,
pollution, and airport congestion. 210 Additionally, the court ob-
served, the Fifth Circuit has suggested that restrictions aimed at
preventing an airport from having to shut down its operations
might constitute a permissible exercise of proprietary power.2 1
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals had little difficulty distinguish-
ing the case before it from the cases in which local regulations
had been approved. 212
Fort Worth and American did not argue that enforcement of
the Bond Ordinance restrictions were necessary to abate present
or future noise levels, air pollution, airport congestion, or any
other similar problem. Nor did they assert that the Bond Ordi-
nance restrictions were necessary to protect DFW from becom-
ing financially unviable.21 3  Instead, they argued that
enforcement of the Bond Ordinance restrictions was necessary
to protect the competitive position of DFW as the region's domi-
nant airport, a justification the court emphatically rejected:
"[N]either the federal courts nor any federal agency charged
with the responsibility of administering the ADA has ever al-
lowed a local government to impose restrictions at its own air-
port, or a neighboring airport, for the mere purpose of limiting
competition with another airport preferred by that govern-
ment. '2 14 To restrict routes on that basis, the court stated,
"would be contrary to the competition inherent in a deregu-
lated industry, as well as the Congressional intent of the ADA
that airport proprietors not 'undo federal deregulation with reg-
ulation of their own."' 2 1
5
209 See id. (citing Nat'l Helicopter, 137 F.3d at 88-89; Western Air Lines, 658 F.
Supp. at 958).
210 See Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 93 (citing Santa Monica Airport Ass'n, 659 F.2d at
104, National Helicopter, 137 F.3d at 88-89; Western Air Lines, 817 F.2d at 223).
211 See id. (citing City of Houston, 679 F.2d at 1191).
212 See id.
213 See id. at 93-94. See also J. Scott Hamilton, Allocation of Airspace as a Scarce
National Resource, 22 TRANSP. LJ. 251, 269 (1994) (stating that "no U.S. airport
has ever failed to make a payment on a revenue bond and none has ever
defaulted.").
214 See id. at 94.
215 See id. at 94-95.
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As in the Fifth Circuit appeal, Fort Worth and American re-
lied on cases approving airport perimeter rules. But the perime-
ter rules in those cases, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
explained, were not upheld as valid attempts to limit competi-
tion between airports. 21 6 Rather, the airport proprietors demon-
strated that the restrictions were necessary to prevent
congestion, harsh environmental effects, or the shutting down
of operations at a neighboring airport. The Bond Ordinance
restrictions, the court observed, were not necessary to achieve
those or any other legitimate goal, including maintaining the
financial viability of DFW.217 To emphasize this point, the court
referred to the 1992 DOT study finding that DFW would "con-
tinue to grow and remain the region's dominant airport" re-
gardless of whether service at Love Field was expanded under
the Shelby Amendment. 218
Perhaps sensitive to the political ramifications of its deci-
sion,219 the court concluded its analysis of the proprietary pow-
ers issue with the observation that even if it were inclined to
agree with Fort Worth and American, it could not substitute its
judgment for that of the DOT. "Under the clear mandate of the
United States Supreme Court, we must give 'controlling weight'
to reasonable DOT interpretations of the ADA. ' 220 Retreating
somewhat from its earlier declaration that it did not consider
itself bound by the Fifth Circuit ruling, the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals emphasized that the Fifth Circuit had concluded that
the DOT carefully considered all relevant factors and arrived at
a reasonable conclusion in deciding that the Bond Ordinance
restrictions are unenforceable under the ADA. "We are there-
fore constrained to give the DOT order controlling weight even
if we would decide the preemption issue differently.
2 2
'
4. The Commuter Airlines Exception
As they did in the Fifth Circuit, Fort Worth and American ar-
gued that the air passenger service at Love Field proposed by
216 See Legend, 23 S.W.3d.
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 Cf Bob Ray Sanders, Fort Worth Mayor Speaks the Truth on Suits Between Enti-
ties, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM,JUIY 9, 2000 at 1. See generally Symposium, Politi-
cal Aspects of Appellate Law, 30 ST. MARY'S LJ. 1137 (1999).
220 See Legend at 23 S.W.3d at 95 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., 510 U.S. at 366-67).
221 Id.
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Legend and Continental was not within the commuter airlines
exception in the Wright Amendment, as modified by the Shelby
Amendment. They asserted that the Shelby Amendment au-
thorized only shorthaul service from Love Field because the
Wright Amendment was intended to limit Love Field to
shorthaul service and only shorthaul turboprop aircraft had a
passenger capacity of 56 or less when the Wright Amendment
was enacted.222
Observing that the term "commuter airlines" is not defined in
either the Shelby or Wright Amendments, the court began its
analysis by explaining that when the Wright Amendment was en-
acted in 1979, only turboprop planes had a passenger capacity
of 56 passengers or less.2 23 Those aircraft were only marketed
for service on shorthaul routes because they were severely lim-
ited in range.224 Consequently, the court noted, the Wright
Amendment has previously been interpreted to exclude larger
aircraft with longhaul capabilities. 225 "In recent years, however,
aircraft manufacturers have developed regional jets that typi-
cally have no more than 56 seats and offer attractive service on
long flights. Large aircraft can also be reconfigured to hold no
more than 56 passengers. "226
The Shelby Amendment, explained the court, modified the
commuter airlines exemption by defining the phrase "passenger
capacity of 56 passengers or less" to include "any aircraft, except
aircraft exceeding gross aircraft weight of 300,000 pounds, recon-
figured to accommodate 56 or fewer passengers if the total num-
ber of passenger seats installed on the aircraft does not exceed
56."227 Noting that the Fifth Circuit had determined it to be
reasonable, the court agreed with the DOT's determination that
the effect of the Shelby Amendment was to permit any airline,
operating any aircraft with a capacity of no more than 56 passen-
gers, to provide geographically unrestricted interstate service
from Love Field. 2 8
As the DOT explained, even if the Wright Amendment were
unclear on the meaning of commuter airlines, the enactment of
222 See id. at 96.
223 See id.
221 See id.
225 See id. (citing Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444,
1454-55 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
226 Legend, 23 S.W.3d at 96.
227 See id. (emphasis added to the quoted statutory language by the court).
228 See id. at 96-97.
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the Shelby Amendment demonstrates that Congress no longer
intends to limit the commuter aircraft exemption to shorthaul
service. Summarizing its holding, the court explained, "[a]
plain reading of the Shelby Amendment... shows that congres-
sional intent has shifted toward allowing commuter airlines to
operate many types of aircraft out of Love Field that are capable
of providing long-haul service. Appellees' narrow definition of
commuter airlines would frustrate this clear intent and render
the express language of the Shelby Amendment
meaningless." 229
VI. CONCLUSION
Anyone believing that the cases discussed in this article mark
the end of the legal battles over airline service at Love Field
would do well to remember the words of Mark Twain: "The re-
ports of my death are greatly exaggerated. 21 ' Even so, one con-
tentious issue has been resolved, and it is now clear that
notwithstanding the agreements in the Bond Ordinance that
gave birth to DFW Airport, Dallas and Fort Worth may not re-
strict service at Love Field to promote the use of DFW. The im-
pact of these cases, however, will not be limited to the Dallas-
Fort Worth area. In fact, officials in the Charleston, West Vir-
ginia area are already analyzing the Fifth Circuit's decision to
determine what effect it may have on their plans to create a re-
gional airport.23 '
The fundamental lesson from these cases is that local govern-
ments are likely to run afoul of the Airline Deregulation Act's
preemption provision when enacting regulations designed
solely to protect an airport from economic competition. True,
the Fifth Circuit was unwilling to "limit the scope of proprietary
powers to those which have been previously recognized" and ex-
pressed a willingness to consider reasonable and non-discrimi-
natory regulations "aimed at advancing a previously
unrecognized local interest. '232 But, airport proprietors seeking
refuge in the ADA's proprietary powers provision should bear in
mind the Supreme Court's caveat: "[W]e do not believe Con-
229 See id. at 97.
230 Cable from Mark Twain in London to the Associated Press (1897), in JOHN
BARTLETI', FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 679 (13th ed. 1955).
231 Rick Steelhammer, Regional Airport's Chances Damaged? Court Ruling in Texas
Case May Prove to be Huge Stumbling Block, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, July
6, 2000 at IA.
232 American Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 808.
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gress intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute
through a general savings clause." 2
233 See Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
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